Taxation Without Representation?

Conditions Underlying Anti-immigrant Stances Across EU Member States

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***first draft-comments welcome!****

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Abstract:

In this paper, we explore configurations of conditions potentially affecting anti-immigrant stances across fourteen EU member states’ party systems. For this purpose, we conduct a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). Paying attention to causal diversity and equifinality, we examine the interplay among migration practices and regimes regulating access to citizenship and acquisition of voting rights, electoral and party system characteristics as well as the radical right’s presence and strength. We find that three out of seven conditions (substantial recent increases in migration, voting rights, and proportionality) turn out to be neither necessary nor sufficient for anti-immigrant positions. Two conditions are necessary without being sufficient (post-WWII migration population and strong radical right party), while two are sufficient without being necessary (access to citizenship and number of parties in the system). Our study has implications for discussions about institutional effects on anti-immigrant stances and radical right parties’ ‘contagion’ on party systems as well as for the broader debate on migration in Europe.
Introduction

In today’s Europe, immigrants are mostly seen as a ‘problem’—and while there is variation in proposed solutions, the general climate is negative. The anti-immigrant sentiment is by and large attributed to the (populist) radical right. Research has shown a relationship between flows of immigration and the rise of radical right parties (e.g. Norris 2005; Golder 2003), whose most publicized issue is opposition to immigration (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003; Van der Brug et al. 2005; 2000). Such parties’ emergence and success has been studied extensively (e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Oesch 2008; Kitchelt and McGann & 2005; Rydgren 2007, 2004, 2003; Lubbers et al. 2002; Wodak and Pelinka 2002; Lipset and Raab 1970), and some attention has been also given to their effects on party competition and policy direction by triggering shifts in mainstream parties’ positions or entire party systems (e.g. Van Spanje 2010; Bale et al. 2009; Rydgren 2005; Bale 2003; Minkeberg 2001; Harmel and Svåsand 1997). In this regard, hardly any attention (e.g. Hunger 2001) has been paid to the (potential) role of immigrants in taming this phenomenon. Although migration research recently acknowledged the role played by migrants’ civic and political rights as well as by political parties (e.g. Fauser 2008; Hunger 2001), the literature on political representation and party competition has thus far neglected potential repercussions of institutions beyond the classic ones, i.e. electoral systems. Be it on policy congruence, party centrist/extremism and system diversity/compactness (e.g. Dow 2010; Powell 2009; Golder and Stramski 2010; Ezrow 2007), the debate revolves mainly around the electoral rules’ effects. And yet, we contend that, similarly to electoral systems, migration regimes are institutional settings with potential influence on party stances. By regulating who is entitled to cast a ballot, they split the community’s residents into those that can and those that cannot seek political representation via the fundamental “instruments of democracy”, i.e. elections (Powell 2000). As such, they may impact party strategy in their competition against other parties, i.e. on the positions each party advocates to gain citizens’ support. More specifically, Bauböck (2006a, 2006b) claims that absence of migrants’ voting rights may have a negative effect on party positions in the immigration issue dimension. However, we lack empirical evidence on migration regimes’ actual effects. Moreover, we know little on what affects party stances—and consequently also citizen representation—regarding immigration because the literature typically concentrates on the left-right dimension (e.g. Ezrow 2008; Huber and Powell 1994). Yet, the neglect of the
immigration issue dimension is untenable—not least because migration has become a ‘high politics’ issue (e.g. Messina 2007).

Immigration policy “separates insiders from outsiders” (Luedtke 2005: 86) by regulating who can ‘enter’ into a territory, for how long, under which conditions as well as her legal status (rights and duties) during her stay. Denying admittance to a territory is distinguished from denying citizenship/denizenship rights to those admitted, as being two distinct kinds of exclusion. The current trend in the European Union (EU) is “anti-immigrant” and promotes both types of exclusion. New restrictions were recently introduced regarding entry into the Union as well as denizenship and citizenship in several member states (Bauböck 2006). These developments are puzzling for several reasons. Firstly, migration bears consequences for the functioning—and future capacity and success—of the Single Market. While economists highlight the market’s vital needs for migrant labor, demographers warn against an (increasingly) ageing EU population, which could benefit from immigrants’ high fertility rates (e.g. Givens 2007). This is also where uncertainties about pension schemes for those currently active in the labor market—and the related debate about reforming the welfare state—are also anchored. Secondly, the issue impacts core values of the EU. Albeit a conglomerate of liberal democracies actively spreading its values of ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’ to the rest of the world via trade relations (e.g. Cotonou agreement) or democratic conditionality on its membership (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004), the EU neither liberal nor democratic when it comes to migrants. This has many implications, most notably “dissonance” (Festinger 1957) in Europe’s self-cognition. ‘Double standards’ and incoherence, in turn, give leeway to demagogues for twisting liberal arguments. This is what Strache did in his—very successful—mayoral campaign for the Viennese Land: a call to (young male) arms to defend the city against “Turkish takeover” for “freedom, human rights and the homeland” (FPÖ 2010: 12). Due to the important implications of this phenomenon, its links to Europe’s historical past and its importance for Europe’s future, an examination of fertile/hostile conditions for anti-immigrant policy stances by political parties across EU members’ party systems becomes necessary.

Hence, in this paper we ask: under which (configurations of) conditions do anti-immigrant policy positions come about? We acknowledge the potential role played by systemic characteristics, such electoral rules, party system fragmentation and in particular the presence of a strong radical right. But we also argue that developments in two areas—immigration flows and migrants’ inclusion into/exclusion from the political community—may affect political actors’ general stances towards immigrants and immigration policy. Crucially, via an emphasis on migrants’ civic and political rights and the potential for migrants’ political representation via electoral processes, we provide some common ground for migration and comparative politics’
research (see Givens 2007). Drawing on a variety of data sources, we conduct a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis and find that: substantial recent increase in migration, absence of voting rights for third country nationals, and the proportionality of electoral systems constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for anti-immigrant positions. The existence of a ‘settled’ population that migrated after the World War II and of a strong radical right party constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions. Difficult access to citizenship and a non-pluralist party system are sufficient conditions but without being necessary for producing anti-immigrant positions. Our study has implications for the broader debate on migration in Europe and for discussions about institutional effects on anti-immigrant stances as well as on radical right parties’ ‘contagion’ on party systems.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: firstly, we briefly sketch out the evolution of this policy area in the EU, while stressing --often neglected-- connections between immigration, liberalism and European integration. Secondly, we build on extant works to specify conditions enhancing/preventing anti-immigrant policy stances. Thirdly, we elaborate on the methodology used for our data analysis. Fourthly, we present and discuss our findings. Finally, we wrap up insights gained from the present analysis and suggest avenues for further research.

**Background: The Issue of Immigration at the National & EU-levels**

Migration Policy is an area with a much shorter history than other policies at the EU level. Until recently it has been dealt with by the so-called “third pillar” of the EU (Justice and Home Affairs). The Maastricht Treaty first introduced immigration as an issue of common interest in 1993. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) provided for common measures in this policy area and transferred illegal immigration, asylum and visas to the first pillar. Cooperation among member states in this policy domain has a strong economic dimension, as it is necessary for the single market, the intra-EU border free space as well as the shared external borders; what is more, since September 11 it has acquired a security dimension too (Luedtke 2005). Finally, 2004 was set as the target date of most legislation needed to render the EU an area of freedom, security and justice.

To achieve this, EU member states cannot form a ‘fortress Europe’ --in so far they are are liberal democracies (Benhabib 2002). No regime of this kind, claims Seyla Benhabib (2002: 153), “can close its borders to refugees or asylum seekers, migrants or foreign workers”. But while porousness of borders is a necessary --though not sufficient—condition for liberal democracy, no sovereign regime of this kind “can lose its right to define immigration and incorporation policies” (ibid.). That said, a “particular people’s right” for self-assertion and definition of such policies is not unlimited and “must be examined and evaluated in light of its commitment to universal
human rights” (Benhabib 2002: 154). It is the multiple and atrocious violation of such rights on the grounds of ethnic hierarchy that made the Second World War unforgettable, and the promotion of liberalism and European integration at its aftermath so necessary. To be sure, integration among European peoples concerns primarily economic and monetary matters. Yet, during this process, Europe marketed itself as a common “ideal”, the birthplace of democracy and Western philosophy, of democratic revolutions and human rights (Benhabib 2002). It is precisely on the grounds of these ‘common traditions’ and ‘shared liberal norms and values’ that unification (and EU enlargement) is pursued within the continent (see Schimmelfennig 2001). Hence, anti-immigrant positions are crucial for the survival and success of the European project (“united in diversity”). By being a threat to ‘liberal democracy’ within the EU, they undermine its core foundations. In what follows we discuss a series of conditions that may enable/hinder such stances.

**Fertile and Hostile Conditions for Anti-immigrant Positions**

Political stances towards the phenomenon of immigration should logically be connected to countries’ experience with it. Based on census data, population registers and statistics, Münz (2004: 27) estimates that around 2000-1, the EU15 were host to some 18.7 million legal foreign residents (including those born in EU but holding citizenship of parents’ country of origin). Due to problems in identifying migrant populations as well as comparing their sizes in cross-national survey research, reliable estimates are hard to achieve. According to the available –yet problematic data— and based on absolute numbers, variation seems to exist across countries, with foreign born populations being largest in Germany, France, Italy and the UK; considerably big but less than a million are the figures for Spain, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands. The migrant population constitutes half a million in Sweden, while smaller sizes are observed in Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Ireland and Greece (ibid.; see also Lelkels et al. 2009). Despite uncertainty about exact quantities of migrant populations, we can say with confidence that countries differ qualitatively in their migration experience. In some member states immigration was practiced right after the Second World War (e.g. Germany), while others were emigration countries (e.g. Greece). In the 1980s, however, substantial recent immigration was observed also in formerly emigrant countries. These differences matter with regard to how “settled” migrant populations are in each country, which can in turn influence political actors’ stances vis-à-vis immigration. However, such positions may be affected by the degree to which migrants are excluded from or included in the political community. This is a related matter, to which we now turn.
Within the EU, the issue of legal migration remains an issue of national sovereignty. According to Benhabib (2002: 177),

“the rights of foreigners and aliens, whether be it refugees or guest-workers, asylum seekers or adventurers, indicate that threshold, that boundary, at the site of which the identity of “we, the “people” is defined and renegotiated, bounded or rendered fluid”.

This boundary is important for identity-building at both the national and EU levels and the ideals this process promotes. As mentioned earlier, liberal democracy is such an ideal. Modern representative democracy is based on the notion that every citizen has an equal voice and representatives consider the preferences and interests of all citizens equally (e.g. Bartels 2008; Verba 2003). Crucially, however, the size and composition of the demos, for whose votes candidates compete and in whose name an assembly legislates, is determined by how citizenship is defined, and acquired. Substantial variation across EU member states regarding migration regimes regulating citizenship as well as denizens’ acquisition of voting rights and naturalization (e.g. Bauböck and Wallace Goodman 2010; Geyer 2007; Bauböck et al. 2006; Bauböck 2005b) leads to de jure political inequalities among EU citizens and legal residents.

This is a perplex issue for the EU, where an important part of the population that works and pays taxes within its territory does not classify as part of the “citizenry” in its country of residence. Freedom of living and working in an EU member state other than that of origin is a constitutional right at the supranational level, but acquisition of voting rights is not. Since the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU, 1992), intra-EU migrants can participate in the local and European election in their country of residence. Choice among party policy platforms competing for the national government, however, is only possible in the member state of origin. This is quite awkward from a democratic perspective: as citizens living permanently abroad, will not be subject to the decisions of legislatures and executives whose composition they influence through their votes (Bauböck 2005a: 683). Crucially, the nation-state preserves exclusive competences in fiscal policy, while its shares competence with the EU in migration policy. Assuming that intra-EU migrants do exercise their voting rights in electoral processes of two EU member states, they may “express” preferences for policy at three levels of governance. Even if intra-EU migrants are denied the right to choose the government that taxes them, they do, in theory, possess two channels for preference representation in immigration policy (country of origin and residence). Through participation in local elections (country of residence), they can influence migrants’ integration policy, which is usually dealt with by the cities’ administration. If intra-EU migrants would desire restricting immigration to the EU, while, at the same time participating in their host community, they could do so by supporting parties advocating tough immigration policies in the national and European elections and migrant-friendly parties in the
local election. Such reasoning, however, requires good knowledge of the polycentric EU system
and the policy competences entrusted to each level of governance.

In any event, the same privileges do not hold for third-country nationals, who, at the
same time, have become an “object” of electoral campaigns. Voting rights are granted to these residents only in a few countries. If voting rights are not granted, the only route to them is via
naturalization and acquisition of citizenship, whose degree of difficulty (e.g. requirements,
duration, costs) varies across EU member states. Precisely because the EU promotes labor mobility within its territory and member states’ naturalization-related requirements regarding duration of residence vary, mobile third-country nationals may experience tremendous delays in getting properly incorporated into the community (Bauböck 2005a). Importantly, there are occupational differences among migrants: intra-EU migrants (including naturalized EU citizens) are, on average, economically better integrated than those immigrants and foreign nationals form middle- and low-income countries that remain denizens and concentrate in those sectors of the economy mostly in need of the welfare state, such as low-pay jobs (e.g. caretakers, cleaners) or the unemployed (e.g. Münz 2004). Among the EU15, people with migrant background in all age groups tend to have a lower income and a higher risk of poverty than those locally born (Lelkes et al. 2009). Lack of political rights among migrant populations signifies a democratic and legitimacy deficit and the interests of the non-enfranchised labor cannot be represented. They can only be represented indirectly, if they are similar to those of the electorate. Furthermore, Bauböck (2006a; 2006b) argues that in the absence of migrants’ voting rights, political parties can ignore migrants’ interests and engage in anti-immigrant rhetoric. This thesis can be further substantiated using two approaches, cleavage and rational choice theory (see also Hunger 2001).

From the perspective of political sociology, parties have emerged due to diversity of opinions on how a community should be governed. A political party is “one set of elements in competition and in controversy with another set of elements within some unified whole” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 3). Even the etymology of the term implies the concept of ‘conflict’ and ‘opposition’, as the word “party” stems from the Latin verb “partire”, which means “to divide” and its derivative “pars”, refers to a sub-group of a bigger entity (Sartori, 1976: 3). Indeed, politics was born from scarcity and the allocation of limited resources brought about conflicts; the way these were solved was related to the power of the respective political actors. And further, the fact of scarcity combined with ideals of fair distribution (esp. in welfare states, see also: Rawls 1972) gave birth to the question of the right allocation of power. In this context, if migrants’ interests are ignored, then, established parties will be challenged by new entrants in the party systems, who are formed to represent niche issues and thus far neglected social needs --similarly to the transformation of the Green movement into political parties (Hunger 2001). Yet, this
could be enabled by two conditions: firstly, that the interests of migrants substantially differ from those of the indigenous population and secondly, that the migrant population can participate in the political process. Unfortunately, due to sampling and other problems we lack – good quality data, and consequently also - knowledge on migrants’ voting behavior and preferences (but see Wüst 2006). In the absence of the first condition, the second could still put parties under pressure to somehow modify/diversify their proposals so that they can reach out to minority groups (e.g. Lawrence and Maxwell 2010).

From a political economy perspective (e.g. Downs 1957), assuming that party leadership is entrepreneurial and engages in vote-maximizing strategies, migrants can be seen as potential ‘clients’ (or instruments for vote-maximization). In party competition, migrants can be treated as political ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’ (Wüst 2006; Hunger 2001). Here, we argue that party behavior is conditional to exclusive/inclusive migration regimes because these institutional settings impact the political opportunity structure: enfranchising the migrants means a larger and more diverse electorate as well as more/new “potential” supporters. The more inclusive the regime, the higher the incentives for parties to attract migrant votes and distinguish themselves from other parties in the political space, thus resulting in greater diversity regarding positioning on immigration policy.

In short, if immigrants can vote, then the party system’s policy offers will be directed to both migrant and indigenous populations. This means that in countries with inclusive regimes and a diversified electorate parties could theoretically occupy the entire political space. The less inclusive the regime, the less incentives for parties to differentiate themselves on the immigration issue. If immigrants cannot vote, then the policy offers are directed to the indigenous population. While some parties (e.g. small extreme parties) gain votes by mobilizing the indigenous population against immigrants (i.e. using immigrants as ‘objects’ of politics), the rest of the parties would lack incentives to differentiate themselves from them (i.e. by treating them as ‘subjects’ of politics). Hence, in the presence of strong radical right party capitalizing on opposition to immigration (e.g. Van Spanje 2010; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003; Van der Brug et al. 2005; 2000) combined with the absence of migrant political rights (Bauböck 2006a), the strategy of other parties in the system would be to strive for the least possible loss of votes among the (indigenous) voters. In our view, these are conjunctures that may push the party system in an anti-immigrant direction. While contagious effects of radical rights have been empirically documented (e.g. Van Spanje 2010; Bale et al. 2009; Minkeberg 2001), we know nothing about whether conditions of inclusive/exclusive regimes impact the strength of such arguments.

Finally, the broader literatures on party systems and competition as well as political representation of social groups place a strong emphasis on electoral systems (e.g. Norris 1997;
Cox 1990; Duverger 1951). Embedded in such debates, the study of anti-immigrant policy positions across party systems cannot but take into account such determinants. For instance, Ezrow (2008) considers both disproportionality (Gallagher 1991) and party system fragmentation (i.e. the number of effective parties, Laakso and Taagepera 1979) to see whether the latter has a separate effect on diversity within systems. Although it makes sense to consider the number of contestants as a condition affecting the entire system’s tendency towards anti-immigrant positions, this issue is tricky in conventional variable-oriented research: electoral rules are known to exert an effect on the number of parties in the system (Duverger 1951), and hence, these two factors correlate. In any event, scholarship on party policy positioning/party extremism, and party system dispersion reaches contradictory conclusions (e.g. Ezrow 2008; Ezrow 2007; Dow 2001). The most recent—and extended—study by Dow (2010) confirms Duverger’s Law about proportionality leading to more diversity in policy offers by a party system. However, all these studies study policy dispersion/compactness/extremism based on the left-right dimension of political conflict. Mainly due to lack of data, the broader debate on various aspects of democratic representation has ignored immigration issues (but see Kestilä-Kekkonen and Wass 2008). Whether factors, such as the proportionality of the electoral system, or the numbers of competitors play a role in enhancing/preventing strongly anti-immigrant policy stances remains to date unexplored.

**Methodology and Data**

Having identified a series of conditions that can (jointly) affect anti-immigrant policy stances, we conduct a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), which puts emphasis on set-theoretic connections between phenomena, calibration and configurations of conditions (Ragin 1987). This method is adequate for analyzing the kind of complexity that conventional regression analysis cannot model (high-order interactions). It stands in-between variable- and case-oriented analyses (that seek generality and complexity respectively). Unlike conventional quantitative methods, there is no “single correct answer” to draw from the analysis of the data (Ragin 2007). And although rooted in the case-oriented philosophy of traditional qualitative research, fsQCA aims at exploring “what additional leverage might be gained by juxtaposing similar trends in similar contexts” (Krook 2010: 890). It uses the basic principles of Boolean algebra (developed to analyze set-theoretic relationships) so as to identify, simplify, and compare configurations of conditions leading to specific outcomes (Krook 2010).

Thus, we adopt a “causes-of-effects“ approach (Mahoney & Goertz 2006) and use mixed methods of data analysis. Our inquiry is interested in neither testing theory per se nor in prediction but in providing a foundation for understanding the current anti-immigrant trend across EU
member states. We see causal conditions underlying anti-immigrant policy positions not “as adversaries in the struggle to explain variation in the dependent variable but as potential collaborators in the production of outcomes” (Ragin 2008: 114). The underlying understanding of causality is conjunctural: not only may there be multiple paths leading to the same outcome (equifinality) but the impact of individual factors may also depend upon the presence/absence of other factors (Ragin 2000). Set relations in social research “involve causal or other integral connections between social phenomena”, are “fundamentally asymmetric” and “can be strong despite weak correlations” (Ragin 2008: 41). Needless to say, this view does not endorse a priori assumptions of conventional variable-oriented research, e.g. „causal competition“ and „causal homogeneity“ (Krook 2010: 889).

The very first step in applying fsQCA is to identify the population, which, in our case is the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement. With respect to citizenship, nearly all the countries in this population have existed as independent states with their present borders since the beginning of the 20th century (Bauböck et al. 2006). Due to their historical past and late democratization, Eastern European member states display different structures compared to the EU15 (Marks et. al. 2006). Also, in these countries labor migration is still small compared to their total population (Münz 2004).

The second step is to list existing evidence in the form of a data table and summarize the causal configurations by constructing a “truth table”. When using fuzzy sets to assess set-theoretic relations, both the outcome and the causal conditions are represented in terms of membership scores (Ragin 2008: 34). For values to be recorded in the truth table, measuring instruments and the readings these produce are ‘calibrated’ “by adjusting them so that they match or conform to dependably known standards” (Ragin 2008: 72). Calibration is a widely used technique in the natural sciences and is especially useful in situations “when one condition sets or shapes the context of other conditions” – an abundant phenomenon in the social sciences (ibid.). This procedure aims at the specification of three qualitative breakpoints: full membership/full non-membership and maximum ambiguity and is only possible based on substantive and theoretical knowledge about the selected population (see Ragin 2008: 71-84). Sets can be ‘crisp’ (dichotomous), describing either full non-membership (0) or full membership (1), or ‘fuzzy’, where membership degrees range from 0.0. to 1.0. Based on Ragin (2007): a membership score of 1 indicates full membership in a set and 0 full non-membership in a set; scores close to 1 (e.g. 0.8) indicate strong but not quite full membership in a set; scores less than 0.5 but greater than 0 (e.g. 0.2) indicate that cases are more “out” than “in” a set, but nevertheless members of a set. So, while fuzzy sets address the varying degree to which different cases belong to a set (ibid.), the
0.5 score indicates “maximum ambiguity” (i.e. fuzziness) in the assessment of whether a case is more in than out (Ragin 2008: 30).

In what follows, we elaborate on the data sources used for calibrating country membership scores in the outcome and condition sets. For the ‘outcome’, i.e. anti-immigrant policy positions in party systems across EU member states, we utilize data collected by the Chapel Hill 2006 expert survey, which provides reliable and valid measures of party positions (Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen and Marks 2007). Experts have been asked to locate parties on a 0-10 scale, where 0 signifies strong opposition and 10 indicates strong preference for tough immigration policy (Question 25). We calculate mean positions of parties within each party system, both unweighted and weighted with vote shares (see Ezrow 2008, 2007; Álvarez-Rivera and Nagler 2004), as well as including and excluding radical right parties, where they exist. On the basis of this information, we assign country membership values to the outcome fuzzy set ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 (anti-immigrant). For Belgium, we calibrate by taking into account estimates for both Flanders and Wallonia. No data was available on Luxembourg, so it is excluded.

Turning to the conditions included in our causal recipe, we ‘calibrate’ the degree of each country’s membership in each set. Firstly, we construct two crisp sets for immigration as a domestic phenomenon. We consider whether the country experienced (a) immigration after the World War II and/or (b) recent increase in migration, drawing on Politis (2007) and the databases of Eurostat and OECD. Secondly, we operationalize the concept “migration regimes” by breaking it into two different fuzzy sets concerning (a) acquisition of voting rights by third-country nationals and/or (b) access to citizenship (which involves *ius sanguinis/solis* and naturalization procedures with varied requirements, duration and costs). It should be noted that voting rights, where they are granted, they concern mainly local elections, whereas acquisition of citizenship brings with it voting rights for all levels of government. To calibrate, we rely on information about from diverse and manifold sources, namely Bauböck et al. (2006), Niessen et al. (2007), Geyer (2007), Groenendijk (2008) and Huddleston (2009). Thirdly, we construct a fuzzy set for the strength of a radical party in the system, based on information collected by Döring and Manow (2010) and Álvarez-Rivera, M. (2009) --cross-checked with information from Political Data Yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR). Finally, we construct a fuzzy set for proportional electoral systems based on the Gallagher Disproportionality Index (Gallagher 1991) as well as one for pluralist party systems based on the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagapera 1979) at the electoral level, relying on Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). Within our population, there exists variation with regard to timing of elections. Given that we have estimated values of country membership in the outcome set based on the Chapel Hill (2006) expert survey, our calibration for membership in the
proportionality and party system pluralism sets refers to data on the following elections: Spain 2004; Denmark, Germany, Portugal and UK 2005; Austria, Netherlands, Italy and Sweden 2006; Belgium, Finland, France, Greece and Ireland 2007.

After having constructed the truth table, cases are re-ordered based on their degree of membership in the outcome set, i.e. full non-membership, ambiguous membership, and full-membership. The first thing that catches the eye in analyses based on truth tables is whether cases with the same causal conditions have the same score on the outcome. There are two simple measures for assessing set-theoretic relations: consistency and coverage (Ragin 2008: 44-68), whose important for the analysis is equivalent to that of ‘significance’ and ‘strength’ in correlational analysis. In the language of „necessary conditions“ (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000), consistency assesses the degree to which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition considered necessary. Coverage assesses the degree to which instances of the condition are paired with instances of the outcome (i.e. its relevance). To illustrate, X is a necessary condition for Y if X is always present when Y occurs. Hence, cases where X = 1 and Y = 0 are ‘irrelevant’ (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000: 846), while it takes just one case (whereby Y is present but X is not) to ‘reject’ a necessary condition conjecture. If X is a sufficient condition for Y then when X is present/absent then Y is present. Sufficiency arguments, therefore, permit multiple causal paths. In fuzzy sets, we take into account degrees of membership and cases with strong membership in the causal condition provide the most relevant consistent and inconsistent cases (Ragin 2008: 50). Inconsistent cases are those with stronger membership in the causal condition than in the outcome set. Finally, consistency and coverage may work against each other, i.e. high consistency yielding low coverage (Ragin 2008: 55). Based on this logic, in the next section we assess the set-theoretic relations under study.

Analysis

Our set-theoretic recipe comprises constellations of factors that jointly produce (or avert) anti-immigrant stances. Based on the Chapell Hill expert survey data, only four out of fourteen cases belong fully to the outcome set (AT, D, DK, and UK). The rest of the cases is equally divided into cases that do not display anti-immigrant positions (BE, FIN, GR, and IT) and cases whose membership in the outcome set is ambiguous (FR, IE, NL, PT, ES). The (degrees of set) membership is illustrated by the Truth Table. What do these findings show about consistency and relevance of the set-theoretic relationships?

Firstly, all four countries sharing the outcome (AT, D, DK, UK), also share full membership in the set ‘post War II Migration Population’. Two countries with strong membership in this set that have been classified as “ambiguous” members of the outcome set
(FR, NL) constitute inconsistent cases. The condition is also shared by two non-members of the outcome set (BE, SE). Hence, immigration after the war (which implies settled migrant populations) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for anti-immigrant positions.

Secondly, ‘substantial recent increase in migration’ seems to be a neither necessary nor sufficient for anti-immigrant positions, as there exists no case displaying full membership in the condition and the outcome set, while there are cases with full membership in the causal condition that do not display the outcome (GR and IT).

Thirdly, two full and two ambiguous members of the outcome set display full membership into the set granting ‘no voting rights to 3rd country nationals’ (AT, D and FR, ES). That said, granting voting rights seems to be neither necessary (GR and IT) nor sufficient (NL; UK and especially DK) for hindering anti-immigrant policy stances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU state</th>
<th>Post-WWII Migration Population</th>
<th>Substantial Recent Increase in Migration</th>
<th>Voting Rights</th>
<th>Access to Citizenship</th>
<th>Strong Radical Right</th>
<th>EL System Proportionality</th>
<th>Party System Plurality (EffNv)</th>
<th>Anti-Immigrant Positions</th>
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Fourthly, none of the four ‘outcome set’ members enjoys full membership in the set ‘easy access to citizenship’, i.e. displaying either full non-membership (AT) or weak membership (D, DK, UK). Weak membership into this set is also displayed by three ambiguously anti-immigrant cases (ES, NL, PT), while full (BE) or high membership (FIN, SE) into this set is displayed by three cases lacking anti-immigrant positions. The relationship is less consistent in the cases of Ireland and the Netherlands, which enjoy high (but not full) membership in the set and are ambiguous members of the outcome set. The cases of Greece and Italy are also inconsistent but
less relevant to the argument. Access to citizenship seems to be a sufficient but not necessary condition for averting anti-immigrant positions.

Fifthly, all four members of the outcome set enjoy membership in the ‘strong radical right’ set. Yet, only one member of the outcome set (AT) has full membership, while the three other members display strong (DK) and weak (D, UK) memberships. However, there are full (IT), strong (BE) and weak (GR) members of this causal set lacking anti-immigrant policy positions. This suggests that the presence of a strong radical party is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Among the cases under study, less consistency (and relevance) to the outcome is provided by Denmark and even less by Germany and the UK, whose membership is stronger in the outcome than in the causal set. There are also two inconsistent cases with strong membership in the causal and ambiguous adherence to the outcome set (FR and NL).

Sixthly, while three out of four anti-immigrant cases also have a very proportional electoral system, the cases of the UK and Finland combined suggest that membership into this set is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for anti-immigrant stances.

And finally, the four anti-immigrant cases have ambiguous (D) or full non-membership (AT, DK, UK) into the pluralist causal set. Lack of anti-immigrant positions is paired with full (BE) or strong membership into this set (FIN, IT, SE), suggesting that a high effective number of parties may be a sufficient condition thwarting anti-immigrant positions. At the same time, the cases of Greece and -- less consistently-- Ireland undermine the argument about necessity of this condition for preventing the outcome.

Conclusion
The next step in this research route is to make full use of the fsQCA tools and see whether additional insights can be gained by estimating proportions of membership in causal combinations using the relevant software. Nonetheless, this preliminary analysis does shed new light to the conditions underlying the current anti-immigrant trend. Firstly, three out of seven ingredients in our causal recipe constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions (substantial recently increased migration, voting rights, proportionality). Secondly, two conditions seem to be necessary without being sufficient (post-WWII migration population, strong radical right). Yet, if we compare membership in the two causal sets, there is less consistency to the argument that anti-immigrant policy positions are affected by the presence of a strong radical right party than by the presence of a population that immigrated half a century ago (suggesting ‘settled’ ethnic minorities). Thirdly, two conditions are sufficient without being necessary (difficult access to citizenship and non-pluralist party system). What is most obvious from this study is that causal analysis cannot and should not be confined to estimates of “independent” variables’ net effects.
on a phenomenon. If we accept that anti-immigrant positions are products of more complex relationships between social phenomena, then we can depict this complexity by relying on a variety of underlying conditions, which may be qualitative and/or quantitative in nature. By doing so, we can enhance our understanding of phenomena such as anti-immigrant stances, whose analysis typically ignores configurations of socio-structural, party-systemic and institutional conditions, such as settled migrant populations in countries with relatively low numbers of contestant parties, a radical right party and restricted access to citizenship. Our analysis suggests that these conditions may enable each other and jointly affect stances to immigration.

1 We would like to thank Sylvia Kritzinger for discussing with us some of the ideas developed in this paper. Also, we appreciate support by the European Science Foundation (ESF) and the Austrian Science Fond (FWF) and research assistance by Therese Kaiser, Carmen Valero-Gomez and Paula Thun-Hohenstein. All errors remain our own.

2 The term has been introduced to the debate on citizenship by Hammar (1994). It was coined in 18th century England to describe a status half-way between a citizen and a non-citizen, who similarly to naturalized foreigners, was denied access to military and civil offices and grant of lands, tenements and hereditaments from the Crown (e.g. Groenendijk 2006; Bauböck 1994). It now refers to third country nationals, who are legal residents, pay taxed and benefit from the welfare state but have no political rights. Third country nationals include foreign born immigrants and their children/grandchildren that did not acquire the host country’s citizenship at birth or through naturalization (Münz 2004).

3 Drawing on social psychology, dissonance occurs when an individual must choose between attitudes and behaviors that are contradictory (Festinger 1957).

4 Even if interests do not differ, normative accounts would expect parties to diversify their ranks so as to achieve higher descriptive representation.

5 The aim is to determine whether: conditions exist in relationships of logical ‘and’/‘or’; they join together with other factors in causal combinations; some conditions can be subsumed into others (Krook 2010: 890).

6 In the „effects-of-causes“ tradition (see Mahoney and Goertz 2006), causal competition concerns the assumption that factors exert “independent” effects on outcomes, so their evaluation is conducted “against one other” (i.e. in relation to the average amount of variation they explain). Causal homogeneity refers to the assumption that the effect of an independent variable is the same irrespective of the values of the other variables (Ragin 2008: 112). This is typically expressed in the form “all other things constant”. However, it may be that X exerts an effect on Y, all else equal, when Z is present/absent. This is a causal conjunction.

7 According to their scores in disproportionality, we assign the following membership values: 0 = all above 5, 0.5 = 3-5 and 1 = 0-3 (very proportional).

8 According to their scores on the effective number of parties at the electoral level, we assign membership values as follows: 0 = less than 4 parties, 0.5 = 4 to 6 parties and 1 = more than 6 parties.

References


